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After	 multiple	 discrete	 introductions	 of	 influenza	
A(H1N1)pdm09	virus	into	Sri	Lanka,	the	virus	was	transmit-
ted among humans, then swine. The spread of virus be-
tween geographically distant swine farms is consistent with 
virus dispersal associated with a vehicle used for swine 
transportation, although this remains unproven.
The first known transmission of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus to humans from swine was in 2009. As the 
virus spread among humans worldwide, it was transmitted 
from humans to swine repeatedly (1), changing the global 
genetic landscape of swine influenza viruses. We previ-
ously reported the spillover of H1N1pdm from humans to 
swine and absence of North American triple reassortant, 
classical, and European avian-like swine viruses in swine 
herds in Sri Lanka during August 2009–May 2012 (2). 
Here, we extend these studies through August 2013 with 
the analysis of paired nasal and tracheal swab samples col-
lected from 4,683 animals and serum samples from 3,351 
animals (online Technical Appendix Table 1, wwwnc.cdc.
gov/EID/article/20/12/14-0842-Techapp1.pdf) and com-
prehensively analyze full genomes of viruses isolated from 
samples from 26 swine (11 isolated in 2009, 4 in 2010, and 
11 in 2011) and 35 humans (6 isolated in 2009, 17 in 2010, 
9 in 2011, and 3 in 2012) and 2 publicly available hemag-
glutinin sequences of human H1N1pdm viruses from Sri 
Lanka. Sequences generated in this study are available in 
GenBank (KJ856002–KJ856446). 
The Study
To understand the molecular epidemiology and spatial 
and temporal dynamics of spillover events, we compared our 
data with full-genome sequences of H1N1pdm available in 
public databases as of August 28, 2013. These include all 
available full genome sequences from swine H1N1pdm vi-
ruses (n = 82), all human H1N1pdm viruses from outside of 
the USA (n = 957), and 100 randomly selected full genome 
sequences from 1,500 human H1N1pdm sequences from the 
United States. Reassorted swine or human viruses contain-
ing H1N1pdm virus genes were excluded from this analysis. 
Our final dataset included the full genomes of 35 human and 
26 swine samples from Sri Lanka and a global sample of 
1,057 human and 82 swine virus sequences.
The single breakpoint recombination and genetic al-
gorithm for recombination detection methods (3) excluded 
the presence of reassortants in our dataset; hence, we used 
concatenated genomes of 8 gene segments for all subse-
quent analyses. We conducted multiple-sequence align-
ment using MUSCLE (4) and optimized the sum of all of 
the pairs of characters manually. Phylogenetic trees and 
bootstrap supports were estimated by using the GTR+I+Γ 
nucleotide substitution model as identified by using JMod-
eltest (5) and the maximum likelihood method in RaXML 
(6). We inferred dates of introduction of major Sri Lankan 
human and swine lineages using the relaxed clock method 
under a Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo approach 
(BEAST v1.7) (7).
Figure 1 illustrates independent introductions of at least 
8 H1N1pdm sublineages into Sri Lanka during 2009–2012. 
Six of these were exclusively detected in humans: hu1 
(2009), hu2 (2009), hu3 (2009), hu5 (2010/11), hu6 (2011), 
and hu7 (2011). One was exclusively from swine (sw1; 
2009/10) and 1 sublineage was detected in both humans 
(hu4; 2011) and swine (sw2; 2011) (Figures 1, 2). Similar 
multiple discrete introductions of human H1N1pdm viruses 
have been reported in the United Kingdom and India (8,9).
In Sri Lanka, swine H1N1pdm clusters sw1 (2009/10) 
and sw2 (2011) were genetically distinct from each other 
and from other swine viruses isolated globally, indicating 2 
separate introductions to local swine that circulated among 
swine for 11 and 4 months, respectively, for each cluster. 
The sw1 and sw2 lineages did not appear to establish long-
term sustained transmission within pigs. However, the 
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reduced surveillance of farms during the period 2012–2013 
(online Technical Appendix Table 1) means that this con-
clusion has to be qualified in regard to the sw2 lineage. 
We did not identify ancestors of sw1 in Sri Lanka, how-
ever sw2 appears to have been directly derived from hu4, 
which included the majority of the human viruses (20/35) 
sequenced from Sri Lanka. The lack of identification of a 
human ancestor for sw1 may be related to insufficient hu-
man influenza genomic data obtained from Sri Lanka dur-
ing 2009–2010 (Figures 1, 2). Although the 11 sw2 viruses 
were isolated from pigs on farms A, C, and G, which were 
separated by >25 km from each other (Table, Figure 2), 
they form a monophyletic clade with no human isolates 
within this cluster. Even though the paucity of human vi-
ruses sampled is a limitation in this study, the data suggest 
a single introduction of human viruses into swine followed 
by transmission within and between swine farms for >4 
months (Figure 2).
To clarify transmission patterns between affected swine 
farms in Sri Lanka, we obtained contact patterns by inter-
viewing pig farmers using a structured questionnaire (online 
Technical Appendix) with approval from the Ethics Review 
Committee, Faculty of Medicine, Ragama, Sri Lanka. There 
was no evidence of movement of persons or fomites between 
farms. However, during the peak demand period (Novem-
ber–December) of each year that surveillance was per-
formed, a common truck owned by farm M (Table), driven 
by a single driver and an assistant, provided transportation 
from multiple farms to the abattoir, including from affected 
farms A, C, and G (Table). On some occasions, animals 
taken to the abattoir for slaughter were returned to the farm. 
Pools of water or body fluids were often noted within this 
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Figure 1. Phylogenetic relationships 
of	 influenza	 A	 H1N1pdm	 viruses	
isolated from human and swine 
during 2009–2012 in Sri Lanka. (A) 
Maximum	 likelihood	 tree	 generated	
from a concatenated dataset of 8 
gene	segment	sequences	from	1,057	
human	 and	 82	 swine	 H1N1pdm	
viruses isolated globally during 
2009–2012,	 and	 35	 human	 and	 26	
swine	 H1N1pdm	 viruses	 isolated	 in	
Sri Lanka in 2009–2012. Red and 
green branches represent human 
(hu) and swine (sw) viruses isolated 
in	 Sri	 Lanka,	 respectively;	 gray	 and	
blue branches represent globally 
sampled human and swine viruses, 
respectively. Highlighted regions 
(gray) are shown with virus names 
in	 (B)	and	(C),	 respectively.	Support	
values	estimated	from	500	maximum	
likelihood bootstrap replicates are 
shown along the node for each swine 
and	 human	 clusters	 identified	 in	 Sri	
Lanka in (A) and for each node with 
>70%	support	for	(B)	and	(C).
truck, and it is possible that viable swine influenza viruses 
may have survived for varying periods. We did not test these 
fluids from the common transportation truck for influenza 
viruses; this is also a limitation of the study. 
Of the 15 farms on which the common truck was used, 
swine on 3 (20%) were infected by a sw2 clade virus; on 2 
farms on which the common truck was not used, no swine 
were infected. This association was not statistically signifi-
cant (p = 1.0), however, given the small numbers of farms 
investigated. Our findings are consistent with dispersal of 
sw2 clade viruses in association with the truck to infect 
multiple farms that were geographically distant, but this 
remains unproven. It was previously documented that in-
fluenza viruses can remain viable for prolonged periods of 
time in water at a temperature of ≈28°C (comparable ambi-
ent temperature in the Western Province, Sri Lanka) (10) 
and are reported to survive longer periods on nonporous 
surfaces (11). Influenza virus has been detected in air sam-
ples from rooms of experimentally infected pigs (12) and 
in the exhaust air samples collected up to 1 mile away from 
the index farm (13), indicating the possibility of aerosol 
transmission for some distance. Notably, studies of the 
swine populations in the United States have demonstrated 
spatial dissemination of swine influenza viruses of human 
origin to match long-distance swine movements (14).
Despite widespread inter-farm transmission of sw1 and 
sw2, our results show that only animals on farm C were in-
fected in both spillover events. Farms A and G, on which 
swine were infected by sw2 in 2011, appeared not to have had 
infected swine during 2009–2010, as shown by both virus iso-
lation and serologic testing (online Technical Appendix Table 
1). Maternally derived antibodies transferred through colos-
trum from dams infected during 2009–2011 may have pro-
vided passive protection to offspring born in 2010–2011. On 
swine farms in Sri Lanka, female swine are used for breeding 
for ≈2–3 years. In experimental challenge, maternally derived 
antibodies provided some protection against disease, but not 
complete protection from infection (15).
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Figure 2. Phylogeny and divergence times of the concatenated 
whole	 genome	 of	 2	 swine	 pandemic	 influenza	 A(H1N1)	
(H1N1pdm)	virus	clusters	(sw	1	and	2)	detected	in	Sri	Lanka	(A,B)	
and	distribution	of	swine	farms	yielding	H1N1pdm	virus	isolates	
during	 2009–2013.	 Gray	 branches	 represent	 global	 H1N1pdm	
viruses and black branches represent human and swine 
H1N1pdm	viruses	isolated	in	this	study.	Farm	of	origin	is	provided	
for all swine isolates. Gray bars on the tree nodes represent 
95%	highest	posterior	density	intervals	of	divergence	times.	The	




coalescent	population	size,	in	BEAST	(7).  The number of swine 
H1N1pdm	viruses	isolated	in	the	farm	is	provided	in	brackets	(C).	
The	 farms	 from	which	H1N1pdm	viruses	were	 isolated	 in	2011	




This study demonstrates natural independent spill-
over events of H1N1pdm influenza viruses from humans 
to swine. H1N1pdm viruses appear to be spread by mul-
tiple, discrete introductions to swine, after which clonal 
expansion occurs within the swine. The spread of such 
virus lineages across multiple farms is consistent with 
virus dispersal by breaches of external biosecurity mea-
sures, including the manner of swine transportation, al-
though this remains unproven given the small sample 
size. Unlike classical swine influenza, North American 
triple reassortant, and European avian swine viruses that 
have persistently circulated among swine for several de-
cades in other countries (15), H1N1pdm does not appear 
to establish long-term lineages in swine in the absence of 
further reassortment. This observation requires confirma-
tion in other geographic settings.
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